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Abstract. The Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) with its liquid circulating fuel and its fast neutron spectrum
calls for a new safety approach and adaptation of the analysis tools. In the frame of the Horizon2020 program
SAMOFAR (Safety Assessment of the Molten Salt Fast Reactor), a safety approach suitable for Molten Salt
Reactors has been developed and is now applied to the MSFR. For this purpose, the Lines of Defence (LoD)
method is selected to drive the design consistently with the Defence in Depth principle. This paper presents the
main characteristics of the method, along with some practical guidelines to apply it to the specific case of the
MSFR; moreover, some initiating events are analyzed through the implementation of the LoD tool. The
outcomes of this analysis drive the design evolution.1 Introduction
Nuclear power is recognized as an outstanding source for
base load low-carbon electricity production and it is
included in all energy scenarios in the European Energy
Roadmap 2050. The development of fast breeder reactors
and associated fuel cycles is fundamental to improve the
utilization of nuclear fuel.
New generation nuclear reactors are expected to be
designed with the highest safety standards. In that frame,
there is an incentive to look for nuclear concepts with
enhanced intrinsic safety features. Optimized waste
management is also an important goal for the new
generation of nuclear systems.
Together with five other nuclear energy systems, the
Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) was selected by the
Generation IV International Forum (GIF) due to its
promising design and unique safety features [1,2] and is
currently studied in the frame of the Horizon2020 program
SAMOFAR (Safety Assessment of the Molten Salt Fast
Reactor). Its main objective is “to prove the reliability of
the innovative safety concepts of the MSFR by advanced
experimental and numerical techniques, to deliver a
breakthrough in nuclear safety and optimal waste
management” [3].
Using the Functional Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FFMEA) and the Master Logic Diagramnna.uggenti@polito.it
pen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Com
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction(MLD), a list of accidents initiators has been identified
for the plant state corresponding to the nominal conditions
during power production [4,5,6,7]. In parallel, a list of
design key-points that are relevant for safety and that
should be further documented has been provided [6].
Successively, the method of the Lines of Defence (LoD) has
been applied for some of the selected initiating events. This
method helps the designer to determine whether sufficient
safety provisions are put in place for a given risk with the
aim of ensuring that every accidental evolution of the
reactor state is always prevented by a minimum set of
homogenous (in number and quality) safety provisions 
the Lines of Defence  before a given situation may arise.
The objective of this paper is to describe the implementa-
tion of the Lines of Defence method and to present its first
results and the way it drives the on-going design work,
consistently with the Defence in Depth principle.
In Section 2, a brief description of the MSFR current
design considered in the SAMOFAR project is presented
[8]. Afterwards, in Section 3 the methodology used to
perform the work is summarised. Section 4 presents the
first results. In the end, some conclusions and further
perspectives are reported.
2 Description of the system
2.1 General description
The reference MSFR is a 3 GW thermal power reactor with
a fast neutron spectrum and operated in the thorium fuelmons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0),
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 1. Properties of the fuel circuit and intermediate circuit materials [8,9,10,11].
Fuel circuit Fuel salt initial composition




Fuel salt temperature rise in the core (°C) 100
Total fuel salt volume (m3) 18
Total fuel salt cycle in the fuel circuit (s) 3.9
Fuel salt dilation coefficient (g.cm3.°C1) 8.82. 104
Fuel salt density (g.cm3) 4.1
Fuel salt melting temperature (°C) 585
Fuel salt boiling temperature (°C) 1742
Fuel circuit structural material Hastelloy N
Intermediate circuit
Intermediate salt Fluoroborate (NaF-NaBF4)
Total intermediate salt volume (m3) ∼100
Melting temperature (°C) 384
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the core vessel with one cooling sector (left) and description of a sector (right).
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power generation: the fuel circuit, the intermediate circuit
and the energy conversion circuit, which is connected to the
electrical grid and the heat sink. The main characteristic of
the MSFR is the use of a liquid fuel, in the form of a molten
salt, which circulates in the fuel circuit. Therefore, this
molten salt plays both the roles of fuel and heat transport.
The fuel circuit is not pressurized. The selected fuel salt is a
binaryfluoride saltwith, in its initial composition, 77.5mol%
of lithium fluoride; the remaining 22.5 mol% are a mix of
heavy nuclei fluorides including fissile and fertile matters.
The properties of the fuel salt and the characteristics of the
fuel circuit, considered for the following analysis, are listed in
Table 1. As presented in Figure 1, the fuel circuit geometry
[8,12] includes the core vessel used as a container for the fuel
salt, in which 16 cooling sectors are disposed circum-
ferentially. The 18m3 of fuel salt are equally distributed
between the core (central area where most of the fissions
occur) and the cooling sectors. Each sector comprises a heat
exchanger, a pump, a gas processing system, and a fertile
blanket tank. Neutron shielding is positioned between the
breedingblanket and the heat exchangers to protect theheat
exchangers from neutron radiation. In addition, reflectorsare located at the bottom and the top of the vessel to protect
the structures located outside the core. The fuel circuit
structures are made of Hastelloy N, which is a nickel based
alloy specifically developed for fluoride molten salt reactor
[13] takingbenefit of the experience feedback fromOakRidge
National Laboratory (ORNL) in the 50’s and 60’s with the
Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) and Molten Salt
Reactor Experiment (MSRE).
The fuel circuit is connected to the intermediate circuit
through the heat exchangers. Four intermediate circuits are
foreseen, each of them feeding four cooling sectors. The
structuralmaterialofthe intermediatecircuit isnotselectedyet.
The fuel salt undergoes two types of treatment: an
online gas bubbling in the core and a remote mini-batch
processing on-site. The bubbling system is used to clean
the salt from gaseous fission products and metallic
particles. The gas is injected at the bottom of the core
and recovered at the top to be cleaned up in the gas
processing unit before being re-injected in the core. The
chemical fuel processing is performed in the processing
unit, in a separated building on the same site. Fuel
samples are daily extracted/injected in the fuel circuit,
during the reactor operation, thanks to the sampling
Fig. 2. Schematic view of the main systems located in the reactor building; proposals for the confinement barriers are highlighted.
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to control and adjust the fuel chemical composition and its
fissile/fertile inventory.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the different systems and
their localization in the reactor building. The fuel circuit is
connected to other auxiliary and safety systems. In
particular, there are two types of draining systems: the
routine draining system to the storage areas and the
Emergency Draining System (EDS) [8,12]. The routine
draining system, triggered only by active means, is used to
transfer the fuel from the core vessel to storage areas. On
the other hand, the EDS is located under the core vessel to
allow a gravitational draining. The fuel circuit is connected
to this system through valves located in the lower part of
the core vessel. Several types of valves are foreseen,
including active valves, such as valves automatically
triggered (for example by the detection of a too high
temperature/pressure), or by operator action and passive
valves, such as fusible valves triggered by the fusion or the
rupture of a component under too high temperature
conditions. In addition, a core catcher is located in the
lower part of the reactor vessel. The core catcher is notably
able to recover leaking fuel salt in case of EDS failure. It is
based on the spreading of the fuel on a large area and on the
mixing of the salt with a compatible sacrificial salt, which
would guarantee its subcriticality and ease its cooling (the
related decay heat removal circuit is not designed at this
stage). It is assumed that the fuel could be recovered from
the EDS to restart the reactor, while the fuel salt at the core
catcher level would be lost.
In Figure 2, the heat exchangers between the
intermediate circuit and the energy conversion circuitare located within the reactor building. It has to be noted
that other design options are currently studied, where these
heat exchangers are located outside of the reactor building.
2.2 MSFR specificities impacting the safety functions
The MSFR has different features from most current
reactors. The objective of this paragraph is to explain some
of the characterizing aspects of MSFR that are related to
the three safety functions: reactivity control, heat removal
and confinement.
2.2.1 Reactivity control
Some specificities of the MSFR affect the neutronics. First,
the delayed neutron precursors are drifted in low
importance areas because of the fuel motion. This implies
a reduction of the effective fraction of delayed neutrons
from about 310 to 124 pcm [14]. Then, the MSFR has a
strong negative global thermal feedback coefficient, around
8 pcm/K [15], coming half from the Doppler feedback
effect and half from the density feedback effect. The density
effect comes from the fuel expansion and is linked to the
presence of free levels in the upper part of the fuel circuit: in
case of fuel expansion, a small portion of the fuel salt is thus
pushed from the core central area where most of the fissions
occur toward the upper part of the fuel circuit where
fissions are negligible. Free levels are located at the level of
the pumps, at the level of the separation chamber of the gas
processing unit and at the level of the expansion vessel (a
tank located just above the core in the upper reflector). The
intrinsic temperature feedback effects act rapidly since the
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limits power excursion in case of accidental transients.
Thanks to the fuel online cleaning and the processing/
loading during reactor operation, the fuel composition is
assumed not to encounter large variations. In fact, the
amount of fissile material dissolved in the critical zone of
the fuel circuit is just necessary to maintain a critical state
and fertile material periodically injected in the core without
needing to shut down the reactor. Therefore, it should not
be necessary to have a large in-core reactivity margin to
compensate the fuel depletion.
Thanks to the negative thermal feedback effects, the
reactor can be mainly driven by heat extraction [14]. No
control rods are currently foreseen in the MSFR design.
Nonetheless, the injection of gas bubbles in the core may be
used to control the reactivity. Besides, fuel salt draining
towards the routine draining tank or toward the EDS can
ensure reactivity control.
2.2.2 Heat removal
In normal operation, the systems involved in the heat
evacuation are the fuel circuit, the intermediate circuit, the
conversion circuit and the heat sink. Additionally, several
systems, preferentially relying on passive mechanisms, are
foreseen to evacuate the residual power from the fuel with,
in particular, the implementation of an emergency cooling
system for the intermediate circuit, with air as heat sink.
Besides, one of the consequences of the fuel liquid state is
the possibility of a passive reconfiguration of the geometry
of the core. In case of failure to remove heat from the fuel
circuit, the fuel can be drained gravitationally toward the
EDS where its subcriticality is ensured. The cooling system
of the EDS, also under study in the frame of the
SAMOFAR project, aims at allowing a passive removal
of the residual heat with no need for forced convection
(both in the EDS and in its cooling circuit) [8,12,16].
One of the MSFR specificities is the delocalization of a
part of the residual power out of the core, notably because
of the in-core gas bubbling and of the fuel processing. On
the one hand, the residual power produced in the salt is
reduced and, 1s after reactor shutdown, represents only
∼4% of the nominal power. On the other hand, the heat
evacuation from the bubbling system (representing ∼1.5%
of nominal power 1s after reactor shutdown) and from the
processing unit (representing ∼0.06% of nominal power 1s
after reactor shut down) should also be handled with [17].
Fission products extracted in reprocessing and stored in
special on-site tanks are not further considered in this
article.2.2.3 Confinement of radioactive materials
Preliminary safety studies [17] have led to the definition of
the integrated fuel circuit geometry presented above (see
Fig. 1) and now used as reference in the SAMOFAR
project. In case of heat exchanger leak, fuel dispersion is
limited by using a slightly higher operating pressure in the
intermediate circuit than in the fuel circuit. In addition,
several valves are implemented to be able to ensure
the confinement of the radioactive materials at theintermediate circuit level if needed: on the intermediate
circuit leg entering the core vessel (this valve could also be
used to isolate a sector for maintenance operations), on
the intermediate circuit leg crossing the reactor vessel and
on the intermediate/conversion circuit leg (depending on
the secondary heat exchanger location) crossing the
reactor building.
In the frame of the SAMOFAR project, several
proposals have been investigated for the definition of the
MSFR confinement barriers. In one of these proposals, the
confinement barriers with regard to fuel salt in the fuel
circuit, in normal operation during power production, are
defined as follows [6]:
– 1st barrier: fuel circuit containment structures (repre-
sented in green on Fig. 2) that ensure fuel containment
during normal operation;– 2nd barrier: reactor vessel (represented in blue on
Fig. 2) that ensures fuel containment when the function
can no longer be ensured by the first barrier (e.g., first
barrier leakage or fuel salt draining in the EDS);– 3rd barrier: reactor building (represented in orange on
Fig. 2) that ensures protection of the two first barriers
with regard to external hazards, andmay have a dynamic
confinement function (and static confinement function in
case of postulated failures of the two first barriers).
The constraints on these confinement barriers are quite
different from the ones classically encountered on “solid
fuel” reactors. It is worth noting here that the MSFR fuel
circuit is at low pressure. Since both fuel and intermediate
circuits are at low pressure (the only circuit with a high
pressure being the energy conversion circuit) and no highly
exothermic chemical reaction has been identified until now,
the constraints on the third barrier, the reactor building,
may be rather low (potentially no need for a high pressure
resistant containment, provided the energy conversion
circuits are located out of the reactor building).
The fuel can be located in several areas of the plant:
storage tanks, sampling system, processing unit, etc. Thus,
the definition of the confinement barriers should be
undertaken for each possible location of the fuel and for each
state of the reactor operation: power production, mainte-
nance, start up, shut down, normal and accident conditions.
3 Lines of Defence methodology
Themain objective of the Lines of Defence (LoD)method is
to ensure that every accidental evolution of the reactor
state is always prevented by a minimum set of homogenous
(in number and quality) safety provisions  called Lines of
Defence  before a given situation may arise. It allows the
designer to determine whether sufficient safety provisions
are put in place between initiating events and a given
accidental situation, and contributes to justify the
acceptable safety level of the plant in the licensing process.
It is a deterministic method particularly well suited to early
design phases as it can be used as a pragmatic guidance for
the architecture of the safety components and systems,
consistently with the Defence in Depth principle. The
method is also relevant for the identification and the
classification of accidental sequences.
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fast reactors, and is being used in the fast reactor project
ASTRID [18] and other projects (e.g. Jules Horowitz
Reactor in Cadarache), for the prevention of the reactivity
control and decay heat removal safety function(s).3.1 The LoD method generic steps
A very first step of the method is to identify and
characterize the situations for which prevention is studied.
Then, the events that may lead to the situation considered
(so-called initiating events) must be identified.
For a given accidental situation to be prevented
(typically, severe accident), the main steps of the LoD
method are:
1. define the required number and quality of LoDs to be
provided for the prevention of this accidental situation
(the analysis is performed for each function necessary to
prevent the accident situation);2. for each initiating event, ensure that an adequate set of
LoDs (in terms of number and quality) is provided:
– at early design stages when the safety architecture is to
be built, the method provides a guidance to sketch the
safety architecture;
– when the safety architecture is defined into more
details, the method permits to check its sufficiency,
and allows the classification of accidental sequences
upstream accident analyses.3.2 Lines of Defence definition
There are three types of LoDs: the preventive measures of
the initiating event (the low occurrence frequency of the
initiating event can by itself stand for a line of defence); the
measures aimed at limiting the consequences of the
initiating event by means of specific equipment or human
actions; and the intrinsic behaviour and natural resistance
to the progression of the initiating event.
The lines of defence are classified according to their
expected availability/reliability:
– Strong LoD, type “a” (initiating event with a frequency
lower than 103 to 104/year, equipment with a failure
rate of approximately 103 to 104 when needed);– Medium LoD, type “b” (initiating event with a frequency
lower than 101 to 102/year, equipment or operator’s
procedure with a failure rate of approximately 101 to
102 when needed).
The experience feedback [18] is that the following
provisions can be considered as LoD:
– Strong LoD (type “a”) can include active systems
designed in accordance with the standards of the nuclear
industry and comprising internal redundancies as well as
electrical back-up; passive equipment, exploited like
confinement barriers, designed in accordance with the
standards of the nuclear industry; intrinsic behaviour
providing a long grace period to perform human
corrective actions. The systems used as strong LoD
must be designed to withstand hazards (notably
earthquake).– Medium LoD (type “b”) can include active systems
without internal redundancy; actions by the operator in
the frame of procedures.
Two medium independant lines of defence may be
considered as equivalent to one strong line of defence.
One of the essential points in the application of this
method is to make sure that the LoDs implemented for a
specific initiating event are independent from the initiating
event and from each other in order to minimize the risks of
common mode failure, by ensuring sufficient diversification
and functional and physical independence between
them [18].
3.3 LoD general application in the MSFR context
3.3.1 Severe accident definition in the MSFR context
The definition of the severe accident is key in the usual
application of the LoD method.
For example, on the ASTRID project, a complete core
meltdown is considered as severe accident. Then, for each
initiating event, the equivalent of three LoDs is imple-
mented (at least two strong lines and one medium line,
“2 · a+b”) upstream from this assumed situation of severe
accident [18].
Cliff edge effects studies, allowing to precisely define
severe accident for the MSFR, are still on-going. For the
MSFR, considering the barriers envisaged (see Sect. 2.2.3),
a situation with potential for large early radiological
releases in the environment would require at least the
failure of the two first barriers.
The general objective retained is thus to prevent the
situation of failure of the two first barriers, with a potential
for large early radiological releases in the environment,
through at least two strong and one medium lines of
defence (2 · a+b). The related mitigation means of such
situation are not further developed in the present article.
As regard to situations that may need to be practically
eliminated (i.e., severe accident situations that may lead to
large early releases and that would not be reasonably
manageable), none has been identitied until now.
3.3.2 Required LoDs after MSFR initiating events
Consistenly, the purpose of investigating the challenges of
the first barrier has driven the process of identification of
the initiating events. (In case of failure of the first barrier,
safety provisions to ensure leaktightness of the second
barrier are then to be studied).
The initiating events challenge the reactor and its
safety functions; they are grouped in families depending on
their potential effects on the reactor [5]. For each family,
specific initiating events to be further analysed have been
selected. In this paper, the application of the LoD method
to some of them is presented. An initiating event initiates
the accidental sequence. The accidental sequence is the
evolution of the accident from the initiating event until the
final consequences and damage. The consequence is the
effect in physical terms of a particular accident and the
damage represents the last impact of failures/accidents on
the population, the environment, structures/assets, and
reputation (in this work it is quantified in terms of loss of
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for radiological releases). The prevention and mitigation of
the accidental sequence is given by the implementation of
LoDs.
The list of MSFR initiating events has been divided
into three categories with incidents, accidents and
limiting events [5]. Limiting events are very rare events
postulated in complement to accidents, to ensure the
avoidance of cliff edge effects in terms of radiological
releases.
Since the occurrence frequency of an initiating event
can stand for a LoD by itself, it is considered in the LoD
method application to MSFR that:
– the occurrence frequency of an incident may be
considered as an initial medium LoD (b) if it is lower
than 101 to 102/year (if not, no LoD should be
accounted for the occurrence of the incident);– the occurrence frequency of an accident may be
considered as a strong LoD (a) if it is lower than 103
to 104/year (if not it should be considered at least as a
medium LoD);– the occurrence frequency of a limiting event is equivalent
to two strong LoDs (2 · a).
With regard to a given situation, the number of
LoD required to cope with an initiating event depends on
the LoD associated to the occurrence of the initiating
event. In practice, as regard the situation with failure of
the two first barriers with a potential for large early
radiological releases in the environment (hereafter called
the “feared situation”), two strong and one medium lines
of defence (2 · a+b) are required. Therefore, this means
that:
– after incident or accident whose occurrence can be
counted as a medium LoD (b), two strong LoDs (2 · a) are
required to cope with the event before occurrence of the
feared situation;– after accident whose occurrence can be counted as a
strong LoD (a), one strong LoD and one medium LoD
(a+b) are required to cope with the event before
occurrence of the feared situation;– after limiting event whose occurrence can be counted as
two strong LoDs (2 · a), one medium LoD (b) is required
to cope with the event before occurrence of the feared
situation.
In the end, this should ensure that a set of two strong
and one medium LoDs (2 · a+b) is always available
between normal operation and occurrence of the feared
situation.
Additionally, concerns related to the prevention of
radiological releases (not only the prevention of large early
releases), as well as availability and investment protection
concerns, are introduced in the LoD application for MSFR,
as part of a graded approach.1 Including the LoD that can be represented by the occurrence
frequency of the initiating event.3.4 LoD application process for the study of each
initiating event on MSFR
Among the list of initiating events established with regard
to the risk of fuel circuit (primary barrier) leak, the LoDapplication presented hereafter is led with regard to the
following initating events:
– a loss of main heat sink event;
– an overcooling event.
In a more detailed manner, the following steps are
followed for the LoD application:
– For each initiating event studied, a description of this
event is provided along with an evaluation of its
occurrence frequency, to determine whether or not the
occurrence frequency of the event can be counted as LoD.– The potential consequences of the initiating event
considered, in the absence of any safety limitation feature
(naturalbehaviour),arepreliminarilyassessedonthebasis
of previous studies, and considering on-going calculations
in the SAMOFAR project, in particular as regard to the
risk of failure of the first confinement barrier, then the
failure of the second confinement barrier.
The goal of this evaluation is finally to define the
number and quality of the LoDs required to cope with
the initiating events, in function of its potential
consequences.
• With regard to sequences or situations which could
threaten safety, with a potential for large early
radiological releases, prevention by at least two
strong and one medium LoDs (2 · a+b)1 is required.
In practice, the corresponding situation in the MSFR
design is here defined as the loss of the two first
barriers with release of a large source term in the
third barrier.
• With regard to sequences or situations which could
significantly impair investment protection or lead to
radiological releases (but with no need for off-site
confinement measures), at least one strong LoD (a)1
is studied.
• With regard to sequences or situations which could
significantly impair the reactor availability or lead to
limited radiological releases (but significantly ex-
ceeding normal operation releases) at least one
medium LoD (b)1 is studied.
For the last two categories, the corresponding
situations are defined more precisely when analysing
each initiating event and its potential consequences.
– Then, considering the MSFR current architecture, a
first identification of the possible lines of defence in the
current MSFR architecture is performed. This set of
lines of defence is compared to the required number of
lines of defence previously defined. To do so, event trees
are used to determine the different sequences possible
according to the success or failure of the possible lines of
defence in the current MSFR architecture. For each
sequence, a comparison is made between the corre-
sponding number of failed LoDs, and the required
number of LoDs. This allows to provide a first feedback
on the MSFR design and to point out possible
improvements in the safety architecture.
– Preliminary outcomes of this LoD application are
summarized in the end.
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initiating events of the MSFR. In this section, the method
is illustrated on two examples: a loss of main heat sink
(LOHS) event, and an overcooling (OVC) event. For each
example, the following elements are described: the
initiating event considered (IE), the potential consequen-
ces (evolution of the accident in unprotected conditions
considering only the natural behavior of the plant) and the
corresponding required number of prevention LoDs, the
possible LoDs to cope with the event in the current MSFR
design, and finally some preliminary outcomes of the
method application when comparing required LoDs and
possibly available LoDs in the current design.
4.1 Loss of main heat sink event
4.1.1 Description of the initiating event
The loss of the main heat sink could result from a failure of
the energy conversion circuit or a failure to remove the
heat from this circuit. This event is classified as an
incident in the classification of the MSFR initiating events
performed in the frame of the SAMOFAR project
[16,19,6]. The loss of main heat sink event is assumed
to be frequent, as it may be caused by equipment from the
tertiary circuit or support equipement (such as the
electrical grid). Therefore, the frequency of this event is
not considered as a LoD.4.1.2 Potential consequences and required number of LoDs
The loss of main heat sink implies that the heat removal
from the intermediate salt circuit is no longer ensured.
Conservatively, it is assumed for the study of this event
that the heat transfer from the intermediate salt circuit to
the conversion circuit immediately stops at the beginning
of the event. As the heat removal from the intermediate
salt circuit stops, the heat removal from the fuel salt
circuit decreases. The fuel temperature increase causes
the decrease of the chain reaction and of the neutronic
power down to a negligible low level. The fuel salt
temperature further continues to rise due to the residual
power. As the fuel salt circulation still operates (if the
pumps are still electrically supplied), the temperatures in
the fuel circuit tend to homogenize. The intermediate
loops act as a thermal buffer, which helps to attenuate the
temperature rise. Taking this into account, the fuel mean
temperature exceeds 1100 °C after more than one hour
and a half [16,19]. The structures, made of Hastelloy N,
may thus undergo high temperatures so that their leak
tightness can be challenged with a loss of investment and
potential safety consequences in terms of releases. Indeed,
a leak in the bottom part of the fuel circuit may occur, but
also in other parts of the fuel circuits: for instance, at the
interface with the fertile blanket, at the intermediate heat
exchanger level, etc. Concerns associated to fuel salt
heating are also related to the confinement of the
radioactive materials as the temperature increase enhan-
ces the risk of release and dispersion of the fission products
contained in the fuel salt.At the intermediate circuit level, the intermediate salt
temperature increases and homogenizes. If the fluorobo-
rate is selected as the intermediate salt, the salt
decomposition should occur with the formation of BF3,
thus leading to pressurization of the circuit [16]. As the
structural material of the intermediate circuit may not
withstand the high temperature achieved, it is possible
that the intermediate circuit fails. A leak at the fuel-
intermediate heat exchanger is also a concern to be further
studied, given the risk of siphoning of the fuel salt towards
the intermediate circuit.
A scenario with complete and long-term loss of the fuel
salt decay heat removal function has not been studied in
details up to now. At this stage, it is assumed that failure to
ensure the decay heat removal function can lead to failure
of the barriers containing the fuel salt (first at the fuel
circuit level, and further at the reactor vessel level if cooling
is not ensured at this level either) with a large source term
involved.
–Therefore two strong and one medium LoDs (2 · a+b)
are required for coping with the loss of main heat sink
event, before occurrence of a situation with failure to ensure
decay heat removal from the fuel salt.
The LoDs put in place must ensure a sufficient fuel salt
cooling so that the confinement function can still be
ensured at the first or second barrier level.
The analysis presented hereafter is firstly focused on the
decay heat removal issues.
4.1.3 Possible lines of defence in the current MSFR
architecture
4.1.3.1 With regard to the decay heat removal function
The foreseen LoDs for the loss of heat sink scenario are
presented through the schematic event tree, in Figure 3.
When the main heat sink fails, the emergency cooling
system for the intermediate circuit must be actuated to
cool down the fuel salt in the fuel circuit. This system
may be counted as a strong LoD, considering that several
independent redundant circuits are provided on the
different intermediate loops (with a natural convection
mode aimed at). In case of its failure, in order to limit the
temperature rise in the fuel salt circuit, an automatic
draining through redundant valves opening in the lower
region of the fuel circuit is foreseen and accounted for as a
strong LoD. In case of failure of the automated valves,
fusible plugs can provide a passive draining and are
counted as a strong LoD. The drained fuel salt is sent in
the emergency draining system (EDS), where the fuel
salt is cooled by a dedicated cooling system. The
emergency draining tank is considered as a strong
LoD. It can be noted that, in case of failures of all the
valves, a leak of the fuel salt circuit could still be
recovered by the EDS since it is positioned below the fuel
circuit. Last, in case of fuel salt relocation in the EDS and
subsequent failure of the EDS, either due to EDS leakage
or failure of its dedicated cooling system, further
relocation of the fuel salt in the bottom part of the
reactor vessel may be considered. A “core catcher”, along
with its cooling system, is envisaged in the MSFR design,
standing for a strong LoD.
Fig. 3. Schematic event tree of the loss of main heat sink event (decay heat removal function).
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In the evaluation process, it must also be checked that
reactivity control is properly ensured. At the fuel circuit
level, reactivity control can be ensured by the negative
thermal feedback effects (considered as a strong LoD, at
least). Should it not be the case, this could result in a fuel
temperature increase and thus lead to fuel draining in the
EDS. In the EDS, the fuel sub-criticality is ensured by the
geometry of the EDS (considered as a strong LoD, at least).
At the core catcher level, sub-criticality should be ensured
through fuel salt spreading and mixing with a diluant salt
(considered as a strong LoD). The reactivity control
provisions thus are consistent with the ones envisaged for
decay heat removal.4.1.4 Preliminary outcomes
With the LoDs identified until now and schematically
represented in the above event tree presented (see Fig. 3),
3 · a LoDs are identified before failure of the two first
barriers with a significant radiological source term in the
last barrier (therefore a potential for large early releases)
can occur in case of loss of heat sink. The prevention of this
situation requires 2 · a+b according to the LoD method.
The independency of the LoDs being amajor hypothesis
of the method, the absence of credible common cause
failures between the intermediate salt gas cooling system,
the EDS cooling system and the core catcher cooling
system should be guaranteed and verified during further
design stages.
More generally, the allocation of LoDs may be different
(but in the end, the required number of LoD stays as
2 · a+b). Other design arrangements may thus be studied.
In this study, it has been considered that any fuel salt
leak from the fuel circuit is recovered in the EDS. In
the course of the accidental sequences, the risk of anintermediate heat exchanger leak should also influence the
scenario and should be further studied.
The study has been focused on the loss of main heat sink
with the fuel salt in the core vessel. Events likely to
challenge the fuel salt cooling when the fuel salt is in the
routine draining tanks during reactor shutdown states,
should also be considered and analyzed according to the
LoD method, in order to define a comprehensive set of
safety provisions as regard to fuel salt cooling.
4.2 Overcooling at low power
4.2.1 Description of the initiating event
In the present study of an overcooling (OVC) at low power
event, it is postulated that both the fuel salt and
intermediate salt are at the nominal mean fuel temperature
of 725 °C, and that the heat extraction at the conversion
circuit level suddenly increases from a few kW up to
nominal power (theoretical case at this stage).
The overcooling from low power is considered for the
analysis compared to the overcooling from nominal power
as there is a higher potential for overcooling from low power
state. The start-up procedure is not completely defined;
nevertheless, it will foresee a progressive reactor power
increase [20]. It is assumed at this stage that the frequency
of the event can be counted as one medium LoD, since it
would imply non respect of the progressive start-up
procedure. This event is classified as an accident in the
classification of the MSFR initiating events performed in
the frame of the SAMOFAR project [16,19,6].
4.2.2 Potential consequences and required number of LoDs
At the beginning of such transient, the temperature in the
cold leg of the intermediate circuit is rapidly lowered. It
causes a cooling down of the fuel salt, with a positive
reactivity insertion and an increase of the reactor power. If
Fig. 4. Schematic event tree of the overcooling event (reactivity control function).
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is theoretically possible to encounter a prompt critical
jump. Indeed, preliminary safety studies have shown that,
if the extracted power reaches the nominal power in less
than 30 seconds, prompt criticality can be reached [14]. The
fuel temperature increases but considering the fast
reactivity feedbacks, the prompt critical jump is very
short and the temperature elevation remains limited in the
calculations performed up to now, below 800 °C [14]. The
prompt critical jump may also result in a pressure wave.
Should fuel salt expansion not be possible, this could result
in a sustained prompt critical jump with sudden and
significant energy release and pressure increase.
A situation with prompt critical power excursion has
not been studied in details up to now. A sustained prompt
critical jump may damage the first two barriers and the
third one additionally, with a potential for large early
releases in the environment.
Therefore, conservatively at this stage2, at least two
strong and one medium LoDs (2 · a+b) are required for
coping with the overcooling at low power event, before
occurrence of a situation with prompt critical power
excursion.
The analysis presented hereafter is firstly focused on the
reactivity control issues, as the potential consequences
previsously identified mainly relate to reactivity issues.
4.2.3 Possible lines of defence in the current MSFR
architecture
4.2.3.1 With regard to the reactivity control function
The foreseen LoDs for the overcooling scenario are
presented through the schematic event tree in Figure 4.
First, detection measures could be studied before reaching
a large reactivity insertion, based, for example, on the2 In the sense that, should a situation of prompt critical jump be
demonstrated acceptable with a high level of confidence, the
prevention level required might be alleviated.temperature decrease in the cold leg of the fuel circuit or of
the intermediate circuit, or on the power variation. The
corrective measures could consist of a stop of the energy
conversion system or valves closure on the intermediate
circuit. The efficiency of such measures should be checked,
with a special attention to the time constants and the
possibility to detect the event early enough. At this stage,
these measures are considered equivalent to a medium LoD.
Then, even if no corrective measures are taken, the
consequences of the event are limited thanks to the fast
action of the neutronic feedback reactions coming from the
Doppler and the density effects. This last effect supposes
that the fuel salt expansion is possible and requires the
presence and availability of the free levels, expansion
volumes in the upper part of the fuel circuit. In particular,
the fuel salt system has three kinds of free surfaces that can
help to manage temperature increases and the consequent
liquid fuel volume dilation:
– the central opening for the fuel periodical transfers,
located in the upper reflector;– the salt-gas separators with controlled pressurization,
located above the fuel salt sectors, supposedly at low
pressure for efficient degassing;– the routine draining siphons (see Fig. 2), which are
attached to the vessel, not to the sectors, and have their
own pressurization. The inert gas is returned to the vessel
during draining via the sampling opening in the
expansion tank.
It is difficult to allocate a priori a weight in terms of LoD
to this quite intrinsic design feature. The LoD method
allows to identify a posteriori how many LoDs are still
required and thus provide an indication on the reliability
level that could be expected from this design feature.
4.2.3.2 With regard to the decay heat removal function
In the course of the accident management, attention should
further be paid to decay heat removal concerns. It should
notably be checked that the LoDs envisaged for reactivity
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(DHR) systems expected reliability.
The current design must be such that the loss of DHR
capabilities by the intermediate salt gas cooling system is
equivalent to one strong line of defence (cf. Sect. 4.1). In
particular, valves closure of the intermediate salt circuits
upon detection of the above overcooling event has been
identified as a possible LoD for reactivity control: the
design should be adapted so that DHR by the intermediate
salt gas cooling system remains available in such case
(avoid to make unavailable a DHR system that stands for a
strong LoD after the occurrence of an initiating event that
stands for a medium LoD), or other corrective measures
should be favored (such as stop of the energy conversion
system).4.2.4 Preliminary outcomes
It should be studied that the design of the reactor, and of
the energy conversion system in particular, and start-up
procedure are such that the worst overcooling scenario
possible remains sufficiently progressive with a time
constant for the temperature decrease of the intermediate
salt cold leg above 30 seconds.
Concerning the rapid overcooling scenario, there is an
interest to look for detection and corrective measures
allowing limitation of the reactivity insertion.
With the LoDs identified until now and according to the
schematic event tree presented in Figure 4, at least a+b
LoDs should be available, in complement to the start-up
procedure and first detection and correction measures,
before occurrence of a prompt critical jump. In this frame,
a focus should be made to ensure the availability of
fuel thermal expansion effect (considering notably the
possibility to introduce diversity andmonitoring). Another
possibility would be to increase the reliability of the
detection and correction measures (making it a strong LoD
so that only one strong LoD is required in complement for
prevention of prompt critical jump).
The availability of the free levels to allow the fuel salt
expansion thus appears absolutely necessary. This point
deserves to be studied more deeply. Indeed, some events
could limit the capacity or the availability of the free levels:
excessive initial fuel salt pouring, blockages, etc. A detailed
analysis of all scenarios that might lead to free level
unavailability would be worthwhile, in order to ensure that
appropriate design measures ensure a very high reliability
of fuel thermal expansion through those free levels.5 Conclusions
The application of the LoD has been adapted and employed
for the specific case of the MSFR, whose one of the main
characteristics is the liquid state of the fuel. A prevention
objective of two strong and one medium lines of defence
(2 · a+b) has been defined before occurrence of a situation
with failure of the two first barriers, with a large radiological
source term in the last barrier (hence a potential for further
large early releases in the environment).The application of the LoDs method has been useful to
highlight the need for further evaluations and to provide
some first feedbacks on the design; in particular:
With regard to the loss of main heat sink event– Two strong and onemedium lines of defence (2 · a+b) are
required before occurrence of a situation with complete
loss of the fuel salt heat removal function. This notably
points out the need to further study the situation where
the fuel salt is drained in the EDS, with subsequent EDS
failure: in this case, the fuel salt would go in the core
catcher and appropriate cooling means must be defined.– The DHR systems (intermediate gas cooling system,
EDS and its cooling system, and core catcher and its
cooling system) should be designed in order to prevent
the risk of common cause failure. Other DHR architec-
tures may also be envisaged, provided the whole
requirement in terms of LoDs required is still respected.
With regard to overcooling at low power event– At least one strong and one medium LoDs (a+b) should
be available, in complement to the start-up procedure
and first detection and correction measures, before
occurrence of a prompt critical jump.– The availability of the fuel salt expansion effect appears
as absolutely necessary: a detailed analysis of all
scenarios that might lead to fuel circuits’ free levels
unavailability would be worthwhile, in order to ensure
that appropriate design measures ensure a very high
reliability of this safety feature.– The reactor behavior in case of prompt critical jump
should be studied in more details.
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